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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY TITLE COMPANY,
a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12271

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENTOFTHENATUREOF
THE CASE
Complaint in equity to set aside judgment void on
its face for want of due process of law under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the State of Utah.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
By pleading entitled "Motion to Dismiss" the
lower court entered an "ORDER" granting judgment
on the pleadings and summary judgment, and dismissed
the action with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order directing the lower court
to vacate its order granting judgment on the pleadings
and summary judgment, and dismissing the complaint
with prejudice, and that the motion to dismiss be denied
and the respondent required to answer or otherwise
plead to said complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is the outgrowth of a case which has been
before this Supreme Court, entitled W. P. HARLIN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs. CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPAY, et al., being case
No. 169179 in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, and case No. 11504 in this Supreme Court, and the files and records in said Case No.
11504 have been made a part of the cause of action in
the present action and are before this Supreme Court
on this appeal in their entirety. (Rec. 25-27). The case
is reported in 23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 ( 1970).
The complaint in said case No. 169179 was filed December 21, 1966. Judgment was entered in said case No.
169179 on January 16, 1969, on the main case, but no
2
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judgment was entered on the cross claim of Continental
.Bank. (Rec. 189 in case No. 11504).
On January 22, 1970, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment entered by Harlan Construction
Company on its complaint, and also on the judgment
on the cross-claim which had never been entered and
and was not before the court. ( 23 Utah 2d 422) ( 464
P.2d 589).
On February 26, 1970, Continental on ex parte
application and without notice to Stanley Title Company obtained a judgment of the District Court for $11,082.60 against the cross defendant Stanley Title Company (Rec. 11-12)
On July 2nd, 1970, the present action subject of
thfo appeal was filed, the complaint being in equity
and to it were attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D, seeking to set aside the judgment entered on February 26,
1970, as against Stanley Title Company. (Rec. 1-14).
On July 13th, 1970, Continental filed a "MOTION
TO DISMISS" (Rec. 15).
On August 14th, 1970, the motion to dismiss was
heard, and the minute entry reads as follows:
THE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISlVIISS COMES NOW ON AND BEFORE
THE COURT FOR HEARING, GEORGE
STANLEY APPEARING ON BEHALF
OF THE PLAINTIFF AS COUNSEL.
ALBERT COLTON APPEARING ON
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT AS
3
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COUNSEL. WHEREUPON THE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS IS
ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND THE MATTER
IS SUBMITTED. THEREUPON THE
COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO
DISMISS. (Rec. 31)
On September 1, 1970, an "ORDER" was entered
(Rec. 20-22) which reads as follows:
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss coming on for
hearing before The Honorable James Sawaya
on Friday, August 14, 1970; plaintiff being represented by George Stanley, Esq. and defendant
by Albert J. Colton of Fabian & Clendenin, and
argument being heard, and the Court having
considered the pleadings, the entire file in W. P.
Harlin Construction Company vs. The Continental Bank & Trust Company, et al., Civil No.
269179, in the District Court of Salt Lake County, and the stipulated fact that the records of
the Secretary of State show that effective September 30, 1967, plaintiff was suspended by the
State Tax Commission of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Section 59-13-61,
U.C.A. 1953, and that the last annual report
required by Section 16-10-121, U.C.A. 1953
was filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State
on March 6, 1868, and the Court, therefore, pursuant to Rule 12 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having treated defendant's motion as one
for summary judgment, and no facts being in
dispute, and good cause appearing therefor;
It is hereby ORDERED:
That plaintiff's complaint be and hereby is dismised with prejudice.
4
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ATTEST:
\V. STERLING EVANS

CLERK
By Byron Stark
Deputy Clerk

BY THE COURT:
James S. Sawaya
Judge.
Other than the above listed documents, there are
no exhibits, motions, affidavits, or other matters in the
files to sustain the motion of the defendant which was
granted.
Notice of appeal was filed September 29, 1970

(Rec. 24)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PROVISION OF THE "ORDER" APPEALED FROM RELATING TO RULE 12(c)
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
VOID FOR THE REASON THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SAID RULE 12 ( c) HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
RULE 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
After the pleadings are closed but within such
5
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time as not to delay the trial, any party may move
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated as ont
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
No motion for judgment on the pleadings has been
filed.
No answer is in the files or records, and hence the
pleadings were not closed.
No exhibits, stipulations or affidavits appear in the
record.
The minute record of the court (Rec. 31) mentions
no motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In view of the record there was no motion made
under Rule 12 ( c) , and none was considered. In this
respect the order is void for want of jurisdiction
POINT II.
THE PROVISION OF THE "ORDER" (Rec. 2022) APPEALED FROM RELATING TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND VOID FOR THE REASON THAT THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 56,
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

6
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-Rule 56 (c), supra, reads as follows:
(c) MOTION
AND PROCEEDINGS
THEREON. The motion shall be served at
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
The case of Christensen v. Financial Service Co ..
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P2d 1010, a case on summary
judgment, has this to say:
Summary judgment can properly be granted
under Rule 56 only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any," which are offered, show without dispute that the party is entitled to prevail.
This condition is obviously not met if the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint stand in opposition to the averments of the affidavits so that
there are controverted issues of fact, the determination of which is necessary to settle the rights
of the parties. The trial judge correctly ruled
that there were such issues of fact here. The
cases relied upon by the defendant are distinguishable, since an admittedly different situation
exists where the averments in the affidavits or
facts shown by depositions and/or exhibits would
undisputably resolve the material facts. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10
Utah 2d 329, 353 P2d 168 .

7
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No motion for summary judgment is in the files.
No answer, exhibits, stipulations nor affidavits
appear in the record, nor any other pleading or writing
to set forth any facts or other matters upon which defendant relies for summary judgment.
In view of the record there was no motion under
Rule 56 for summary judgment and none was considered. In this respect the "ORDER" was without due
process of law, and is void for want of jurisdiction.
POINT III.
THE STATEMENTS OF THE "ORDER" (Rec.
20-22) CONCERNING THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 59-13-61 U.C.A. 1953, AND SECTION
16-10-121, U.C.A. 1953, DO NOT BAR PLAINTIFF FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION AND
MAINTAINING IT.
The record shows no stipulated facts, or that any
stipulations were made as to facts. The "Motion to Dismiss" reads in part as follows:
2. Plaintiff corporation was a Utah corporation.
Its franchise was suspended in 1967 for failure
to pay taxes, and it has failed to file an annual
report since 1968.
Pursuant to # 59-13-61 UCA 1953 upon nonpayment of taxes by a Utah corporation, all of
its corporate powers, rights and privileges are
suspended and such plaintiff is barred from
bringing this action.

8
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This Point 2 cannot be considered on the "1\ilotion
to Dismiss" as it is a matter of defense that cannot be
heard by motion. Rule 12 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, states in part as follows:
(b) HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in
law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defense may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: * * * (6) failure to state a claim upon which {elief can be
granted * * *.
The other provisions of the rule which may be taken
by motion go to jurisdiction, venue, process and failure
to join an indispensable party. There is no provision
that the matters in said paragraph 2 above can be made
part of a motion to dismiss.
There are no writings, exhibits, certificates of state
officers, or any other matters in the record to support
said paragraph 2 above set forth. Even if the facts
alleged in said paragraph 2 were true, which is not
admitted by appellant, it would be of no consequence
as Section 16-10-101, in Replacement Volume 2, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows:
CONTINUATION OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE TO WIND UP AFTER DISSOLUTION-Notwithstanding the dissolution
of a corporation either ( 1) by the issuance of a
certificate of dissolution by the secretary of state,
or ( 2) by a decree of court, or ( 3) by expiration

9
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of its period of duration, the corporate existence
of such corporation shall nevertheless continue
for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property and assets which have not
been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose
may sell or otherwise dispose of such property
and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise
all other incidental and necessary powers.
It appears that Continental in the present suit is
relying upon the f0rfeiture of the charter of Stanley
Title Company as ~s basis for dismissal of the action.
Section 59-13-61, { C.A. 1953, reads as follows:

FAILURE. TO PAY TAX-SUSPENSION
OR FORFEITURE OF CORPORATE
RIGHTS.-If a tax computed and levied hereunder is not aid before 5 o'clock p.m. on the
last day of t1 ~ eleventh month after the date
of delinquenc1 the corporate powers, rights and
privileges of the delinquent taxpayer, if it is
a domestic ,.. Jrporation, shall be suspended, and
if a foreign co""poration, it_ shall thereupon forfeit
its rights to db intrastate business in the state.
The tax comntission shall transmit the name of
each such corporation to the secretary of state,
who shall immediately record the same in such
manner that ·it may be available to the public.
The suspension or forfeiture herein provided for
shall become effective from the time such record
is made, and the certificate of the secretary of
state shall be prima facie evidence of such suspension or forfeiture.
The record shows that the cross claim made in civil
action No. 169179 by Continental against Stanley Title
10
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Company was filed January 13, 1967. The "Order"
(Rec. 20-22) which is the subject to this appeal alleges
that the charter of Stanley Title Company was not
suspended until September 30, 1967. From the face
of the record the present action was commenced before
the charter was suspended.
The closest case in point is that of Prudential Fed.
S. & L. Ass'n. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Utah
2d 366, 325 P.2d 899, at pages 904 and 905, states of
foreign corporations:
. t~i
.1

It is noteworthy that Sec. 59.-~3-61 does not spell
out any disability of corporations so disenfranchisen as to sue as does Sec. i6~-3, quoted above,
relating to failure to qualify.
( 9) We have found no ct~'>e dealing precisely
with the question posed. Btli.. this court has held
that the bringing of one sui,; by a foreign corporation to protect its rights. 'does not constitute
"doing business" within the-~}ate, and that before the acts of a foreign .. tcorporation "could
properly be classified as doing business within
the State, it would have to .be shown that there
was some degree of continuity or regularity of
such acts, coupled with some other manner of
entering into direct business transactions with
others." The logical conclusion from such holdings is that 59-13-61 would not prevent Felt
from bringing suit to enforce the rights growing
out of business transacted while it was franchised
here, even though its franchise had been revoked,
because the bringing of one suit under such circumstances would not be doing "intrastate business" within the meaning of that section.
11
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If a foreign corporation is allowed to sue and be
sued even though its rights have been forfeited to do
intrastate business in this state, it cannot be said that
a domestic corporation whose rights to do business have
not been so forfeited, cannot sue and be sued under
Section 59-13-61 in the light of the last above case.
Furthermore, Section 59-13-63 provides "Relief in
case of suspension or forfeiture." There is no allegation
that such relief has not been obtained by the plaintiff.
Even though proper pleading, it would be faulty in that
respect.
It is contended by appellant that from the facts
alleged in the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 15-16) pertaining to the right of Stanley Title Company to do business are not proper matters to be considered on such
motion, that such facts are matters of defense by answer,
there are no evidentiary matters in the record to support
such facts, and appellant has a right to a defense to
any such facts before a ruling can be made thereon.

POINT IV.
THE COMPLAINT AND ITS EXHIBITS (Rec.
1-14) ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION AND
FACTS WHICH STATE A CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANT UPON 'VHICH RELIEF l\iA Y
BE GRANTED.
RULE 60 (b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIYIL
PROCEDURE provides:

12
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(b) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: * * * * (5) the judgment is void;
* * * * The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1), ( 2) , ( 3) , or
( 4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceedings was entered or taken.
* * This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed
in these rules or by an independent action.

It is to be noted that the complaint (Rec. 1-14)
is based upon facts which are shown on the face of the
record itself. These facts as alleged show the following:
1. The Cross Claim (Rec. 7 -8) is contingent on the

outcome of the original action and does not state an
existing cause of action.
2. The Cross Claim was dismissed and abandoned

by Continental (Exhibit D, Rec. 14).
3. No trial was held on the Cross Claim (Rec. 2).

4. The lower court did not mention the cross claim

during the entire proceeding (Rec. 2).
5. No findings of fact, conclusions of law nor judg-

13
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ments were filed in Civil Action No. 169179, which were
made or filed by the cross-claimant, Continental.
6. The judgment of February 26th, 1970 (Rec.
11-13) was based upon a conclusion of law in the conclusions of Harlin Construction Company, plaintiff in
the main action, and Harlin Construction Company was
not a party to the cross claim.
7. The judgment in favor of Harlin Construction
Company has been fully paid.
From the above allegations, appellant submits that
the complaint does state facts which constitute a claim
against defendant. No other question is involved in the
motion to dismiss.
In the case of Liquor Control Commission v. Athas,
243 P.2d 441, this Supreme Court said:
Where the complaint states a claim in general
language but is not sufficiently definite in certain
respects to enable defendant to answer, the remedy is a motion for a more definite statement,
not a motion to dismiss. Porter v. Karavas, 10
Cir. 157 F.2d 984.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim
upon which relief may be granted can be pleaded
by the recitation of conclusi?ns of la~ or f~ct
or both. l\fails v. Kansas City Pubhc Service
Co., D.C., 51 F. Supp. 562; 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Ed.
22 Am. Bar Assn. Jul. 447.
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246
P.2d 602, the court was considering the vacating of a

14
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judgment entered more than three years prior to the
commencement of the action. This court said:
This court made it clear that the remedy by the
statute is not exclusive and that a suit in equity
lo set aside a judgment for fraud in its procurement may be brought after the time limited in
the statute for a motion to set aside a judgment.
Rule 60 (b), URCP, supersedes and is substantially the same as Sec. 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943.
The Rule s_pecifically provides that it "does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."

*

*

*

*

As stated in Butler v. McKey, 9 Cir., 138 F.2d
373, 376, "It is a basic rule that a judgment is
void and subject to collateral attack if a lack of
jurisdiction in the court appears on the face of
the record."
POINT V.
THE CROSS CLAIM OF CONTINENTAL
BANK IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION 169179
WAS DISMISSED AND ABANDONED.
The original Cross Claim reads as follows: (Rec.
7-8):

As a cross claim against defendant Stanley Title
Company, defendant, The Continental Bank and
Trust Company alleges:
I. On or about September 6, 1966, the proceeds
of the check, a copy of which is identified as

15
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Exhibit A to the complaint, were paid by this
defendant to defendant Stanley Title Company.
2. ~lainti~ claims said proceeds were wrongfully
paid by this defendant to the defendant Stanley
Title Company.
3. If plaintiff recovers judgment against The
Continental Bank and Trust Company by reason
of such payment, Stanley Title Company has
been unjustly enriched thereby and The Continental Bank and Trust Company is entitled to
recover the amount of any judgment by plaintiff against it from defendant Stanley Title Company.
'VHEREFORE, The Continental Bank and
Trust Company prays:
I. That plaintiff take nothing by its complaint.
2. That if plaintiff recm-er judgment against it,
The Continental X ational Bank and Trust Company have judgment against Stanley Title Company in such amount as the court may award
plaintiff against The Continental Bank and Trust
Company.
3. For its costs in this action and such other relief as the court may deem appropriate in the circumstances.
Dated this l:.?th day of J~1nuai:-. 1967.
Peter 'y. Billing-s
Fabian & Clendenin
~00 Conti1wnt~l Bank Building
Snlt L:lkt> CitY. Ctah
Ath)rnt'Y~ t\)r ·Dt.,frndant
'l'lw (\\;lti1wnt:ll Bank and Trust Company
In t'x:tminin~· tht' ··_-\XS\YER AXD CROSS
CL.\ l :\l OF THE CllX Tl X FXT.:\L B~-\XK AND
l~
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TR l-S T CO)IP A....'Y" (Rec. 5-8 J the tntirt d1><:1Jlllt::i: :..s (•nly one document and is a C11uurungJing 'Jf
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It is to be noted that in the Answer and Cross
Claim, there is no allegation that Continental Bank
has sustained any damage or suffered any loss. No loss
is pleaded.

In the case of Greene et al. v. Knox et al., Adams
v. Continental Nat. Bank, 71 Utah 217, 263 P. 928,
one Adams cross-claimed against Continental Bank for
any loss which might in the future be sustained by Adams
on an indemnity agremeent for loss upon bonds signed
by Adams to benefit the bank. This Supreme Court
said:
Independent of the foregoing, the demurrer to
the cross-complaint was properly sustained for
lack of an averment that appellant had sustained
any loss or injury by reason of the execution of
the bond. Appellant's answer to the plaintiff's
complaint, which was made a part of his crosscomplaint against the bank, denied any breach
of the bond or liability to the plaintiff. It is certainly essential as a ground of recovery upon
such a contract of indemnity to show a loss by
the complaining party. In appellant's own brief
when discussing the statute of limitations (a
point not here urged by respondent) , his counsel
say:
"Until the amount of Adams' liability on the
bond is established, of course he cannot sue the
bank. If he were never sued upon this bond, no
cause of action could accrue to him as against
the bank. When Adams is sued, he can demand
that the security be applied according to the
contract with the bank. But, until he has suffered
damages, he has no cause of action against the
bank."
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--After the plaintiff, Harlin Construction Company,
had rested its case in No. 169179, supra, counsel for
Continental Bank made this statement (EXHIBIT
D, Rec. 14):
:NIR. COLTON: If the Court please, I would
like at this time to dismiss on behalf of the defendant, Continental Bank, on the basis of the
testimony that has been admitted to date on behalf of plaintiff's case. The Court is aware tli._:
bank's position is a multiple one.
First of all, of course, we see ourselves as a mmdleman. Resolution of course that that is if ~Ir.
Harlin recovers against Mr. Stanley we would
contend that we would, therefore, be entitled
if he were to recover against us we would be
entitled to cross claim against Mr. Stanley and
recover from him or if indeed Mr. Stanley is
successful in his defense, there would be no
damage and we would be eliminated, of cour~e.
That I can see that particular defenses woul
depend on how the Court finds the facts at L ..
end of the case.
We still contend that the evidence now woulJ
show no liability on the part of Continental and
this would be on the basis of plaintiff's own testimony uncontested without any question.
It is to be noted that the counsel for Continental
asked for dismissal, first on the cross claim and then on
the main case. No objection to the dismissal was made
by Stanley Title Company.

In the case of Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake Farmers Association, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773, this Supreme Court said at page 778 of the Pacific Reporter:
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In Bach v. _Quigan, D.C.N.Y. 1945, #F.R.D. 34,
on page 36 the Court said:
"This Court is in complete accord with the statement of defendant that the new Rules of Civil
Procedure have displaced any 'archaic, obsolete
and confining rules' which may previously have
governed federal procedure and that they are
designed for the swift and just disposition of
legal disputes. However, it was never contemplated that any set of facts which might eventually constitute a 'claim upon which relief can
be granted' should be interposed as a counterclaim to an action and it would not be an aid to
the swift and just disposition of the matter to
permit the issues to be confused by an uncertain
claim, the substance of which is contingent upon
the outcome of the principal action.
"****it is doubtful whether the alleged wrongful motive in instituting the action a_gainst defendant Quigan gives rise to a claim for malicious
abuse of process * * * such a claim does not mature and no relief can be granted upon it until
the merits of the principal action have been determined.**"
Continental Bank's counsel supported the last quotation in his motion to dismiss which he made to the
court, supra, in No. 169179, which on appeal was No.
11504, the full record of which is a part of this appeal
(Rec. 169179, Transcript page 98, Record page 417) .
In case No. 11504 in this Supreme Court, 23 Utah
2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970), this Supreme Court the
following order was made:
And the same order is made as to the findings
and judgment of Continental Bank on its cross-
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complaint against George Stanley and Stanley
Title Company.
Plaintiff, Stanley Title Company, in the instant
case alleges in this connection:
1. There was no independent cause of action alleged by cross claim in Civil Action No. 169179, supra,

which stated a cause of action in existence at the time
of the filing of such cross claim. 41 Am. J ur., pages
473-474, #257, 258 supra.
2. There was no trial held on any cross claim.

Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
FINDINGS BY THE COURT
(a) EFFECT. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury, or with an advisory jury,
the court shall, unless the same are waived, find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of
the appropriate judgment.
3. There were no findings of fact, nor conclusions

of law filed by Continental Bank on its cross claim.

4. There was no judgment entered by Continental

Bank on its cross claim.
5. This Supreme Court had nothnig before it on

appeal on any judgment entered by Continental Bank.

6. The above judgment granted in favor of Conti-

nental Bank was void for want of jurisdiction, and for
want of due process of law, under the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
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In the case of W oldberg v. Industrial Commission,
74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609, this Supreme Court said:
We need not discuss or decide the legal effect
of these matters for the reason that this court
will inquire into its own jurisdiction however that
question may be called to its attention. "We have
no right to proceed to a decision of the merits
on any case where the law forbids us the right
to do so whether the parties desire it or not.''
McCashland v. Keogh, 32 Utah 11, 88 P. 680.
Appellant is not arguing the merits of the present
case on appeal because the defendant and respondent
has not yet answered the complaint, but appellant
strongly urges that it is entitled to its day in court and
a fair trial which it has not had.
CONCLUSION
The complaint (Rec. 1-14) states a claim upon
which relief can be granted. It alleges facts which show
on the face of the record that the judgment of February
26, 1970, (Rec. 11-13) was void for want of due process
of law. The "Order" of September 1, 1970 (Rec. 20-22)
should be vacated and set aside, and the trial Court
ordered to deny the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 15-16),
and further order the defendant, Continental Bank,
to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
George H. Stanley
Attorney for Appellant
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